Hey fellow Europeans,
I’ve been toying around with the idea of a new European military alliance that explicitly does not include the US. Basically a replacenent for NATO. If such an organisation were to exist, how would you define its framework/scope?
Specifically:
- What would you call it? I like EDO (European Defense Organisation)
- Membership: EU-only vs. broader Europe (e.g. UK, Norway, Balkans… Canada?)?
- Command structure: centralized? federated?
- Thoughts on a possible nuclear doctrine?
- Funding through proportional contributions? Or rather a unified defense budget?
- Legal basis: treaty-based like NATO or integrated into EU structures? Both may have their advantages.
I am interested in hearing your thoughts and ideas on the topic.


With the urgency of the problem, I think we should take as much advantage as possible of any already existing structures, and use them as a starting point for something new and hopefully better
Something like NATO minus USA makes sense. Maybe the demented orange shit stain does us the favour of leaving NATO, which saves the effort of giving the thing a new name and legal framework.
But a purely military alliance based on geostrategic interests alone, like NATO, doesn’t cut it. The EU needs a serious own capability of defending itself, as well, as there is strong political, economical and ideological alignment and co-dependence within the EU. I’d strongly argue for it being a separate arrangement from whatever needs to replace NATO, because geostrategic interests can shift easily. (see USA)
Therefore, the EU as a whole needs to step up its defence cooperation and capabilities, both to deter any land grabs by any megalomaniac imperialist dictator, East or West, and to benefit from the economy of scale. As long as every European country is cooking its own soup defence wise, equipment will be (and stay) outrageously expensive, as it is only produced in limited numbers. This will require a unified EU defence policy, and ultimately should lead to a common military. I wouldn’t centralise it too much, though, as this adds a single point of failure. Maybe transitioning via turning the existing national militaries into the EU military’s regional commands could work. Likewise, even equipment produced under unified standards shouldn’t be made all in one place, but needs to be spread out somewhat across the EU, as a single factory is way too easy to put out of production. Also, this way, it’s possible that every member state gets to benefit economically from the defence industry.
For nuclear doctrine, firstly, there needs to be sufficient capability. Unfortunately that means enlarging the nuclear arsenal. Currently, the EU’s only nuclear deterrent is the French nuclear arsenal, which was designed to have the ability to deliver a retaliatory strike powerful enough to make a single nuclear superpower think twice before attacking France itself, because they risk losing all their major cities over it. Now there unfortunately are three nuclear superpowers with potentially hostile intents towards the EU. In the remainder of NATO, there is another nuclear arsenal, that of the UK, which was designed around the same idea as the French one, and is sized similarly, but unfortunately, relies on US made delivery systems with shared maintenance arrangements, (Trident rather than domestically produced SLBMs) so it useless in the long term as a deterrent against an increasingly hostile USA, because they can render the missiles inoperable by ceasing delivery of spare parts. The British warheads also were developed in close cooperation with the US, so there might be a possibility of some spare parts also relying on US supply chains.
As a deterrent, why would it make a difference if there is one or three nations that need to be deterred? The entire idea is that if you have to use it you lost already.
The problem is the size, and the resulting vulnerability of the deterrent.
Both the French and the British strategic retaliatory capability consist of a fleet of 4 missile carrying submarines each. Because that’s how things work, of those fleets, at best two submarines can be out at sea at once, with the others undergoing scheduled maintenance and/or training. That might be reliable against an adversary with limited naval capabilities that is located sufficiently far away. But with an adversary that has the largest navy of the world, that deterrent, whose survivability depends solely on staying undetected, suddenly becomes very vulnerable. (Apart from having a large navy, the US operate a global hydrophone network for submarine detection) Additionally, the range of submarine launched missiles is somewhat limited due to size constraints, so they cannot be easily aimed at every possible adversary at once, leaving the submarine vulnerable to detection and destruction when transiting to a suitable launch area.
Also a purely (or largely) strategic deterrent lacks a credible escalation path from conventional war to one all-out strategic nuclear countervalue strike. Especially a submarine based deterrent, because if a missile submarine fires only a single missile, it risks detection, and therefore potential destruction, before it will be able to launch again, so it’s more an all or nothing approach. Which nuclear superpower is going to believe you that you’ll risk your entire anihilation as a response to a small scale conventional attack on a minor ally?
The first point is a general issue unrelated to the number of adversiaries, and would also be the case if there was only one with similar capabilities.
The second part is the entire point of a nuclear deterrent. Strategic uncertainty with possible MAD is what you want. If the enemy falsely believes that they can have a limited nuclear exchange with tactical nuclear weapons only, they are much more likely to use their tactical nuclear weapons. And a nuclear deterrent is never going to deterr a conventional attack, that isn’t the point of it.
Because the only place you can strike all three countries from with the current French missiles is the Arctic Ocean. That means it is easier to find them and you also know the general direction of a French strike. That matters, because each submarine only carries 16 missiles and all three countries have at least some systems, which can intercept them. Namely Thaad for the US, HQ-19 for China and S-300VM for Russia.
Mostly irrelevant as submarines are mobile and not all three potential enemies pose the same threat at the same time.
That still means that the two submarines will launch at different times, making interception easier and if the submarine has to be moved, it can be found and destroyed.